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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
THE WORK MADE FOR HIRE DOCTRiNE UNDER THE
COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976: WHAT ABOUT THE
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR?
When the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Easter Seal Society
for Crippled Children and Adults of Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy Enter-
prises1 it created a split in the circuits on the issue of when an independ-
ent contractor is considered an employee for purposes of the "work made
for hire" doctrine contained in the Copyright Act of 1976.2
Early common law dictated that one who commissioned an artist pre-
sumptively owned the copyright in the artist's creation.3 The Copyright
Act of 19091 codified that rule.5 Thus, the 1909 Act made an "em-
ployer" the author and initial copyright holder of "works made for
hire."'6 The statute, however, did not define either "employer" or "work
made for hire."
Work prepared on special order or commission, i.e., work done by an
independent contractor, raised the issue of whether the person who com-
missioned such work was an "employer" under the statute and thereby
entitled to the copyright. 7 Courts consistently answered this in the af-
firmative. In a series of cases culminating in Siegel v. National Periodical
Publications, Inc.,8 the Second Circuit developed a rule whereby the
1. 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987).
2. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976).
3. Dillman v. White, 102 Fed. 892 (C.C.D. Mass. 1900). See O'Meara, "Works Made for
Hire" Under the Copyright Act of 1976-Tow Interpretations, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 523 (1982).
4. Pub. L. No. 60 Stat. 1075 (1909).
5. See O'Meara, supra note 3. See also Angel & Tannenbaum, Works Made for Hire Under S.
22, 22 N.Y.L.S.L. REV. 209 (1976) (authors give thorough discussion of law under the 1909 Act).
6. 815 F.2d at 325. See 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
7. See O'Meara, supra note 3, at 524.
8. 508 F.2d 909 (2d. Cir. 1974). The copyright law regarding independent contractors under
the Copyright Act of 1909 began with a line of cases culminating in Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin
Co., 108 F.2d 28 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 309 U.S. 686 (1939). There the court held that a patron who
commissions an artist is presumed to have a copyright in the work unless the artist expressly re-
served the copyright to himself. Id. at 31. The early cases do not even mention the work made for
hire doctrine because they assumed that the commission contracts assigned the copyrights to the
patron. See 815 F.2d at 325-26. The rights to renewal were more limited for an assignee than those
given to an "employer" under the statute; therefore, the Yardley rule was actually inconsistent with
the work made for t1ire doctrine contained in the 1909 Act. Id.
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work made for hire doctrine applied to an independent contractor when
that person created the work at the employer's "instance and expense." 9
That is, when the employer was the "motivating factor" in producing the
creation, the copyright vested in him. 10 Under this rule the employer did
not actually need to direct and supervise the work being prepared. He
merely had to have the right to control the work process."
In Murray v. Gelderman 12 the Fifth Circuit further expanded the work
made for hire doctrine of the 1909 Act. The author of a book contracted
for complete control over the work. She claimed that she never would
have taken the job if the employer had demanded a right to control her
product. The author contended that her book was not a work made for
hire because the usual "right to control" rules didn't apply to her. 3 The
Murray court disagreed with the author because such a rule would allow
authors to circumvent the work made for hire doctrine by demanding
artistic control as a condition of employment. 4 Thus, the common law
interpretation of the work made for hire doctrine under the Copyright
Act of 1909 developed into a virtually irrebuttable presumption that any-
one who paid another to create a copyrightable work was the statutory
author and thereby entitled to a copyright in the product.'
Congress replaced the Copyright Act of 1909 with the Copyright Act
of 1976.16 The new Act does not change the work made for hire doctrine
9. 508 F.2d at 914. The Second Circuit expressly applied the work made for hire doctrine of
the 1909 Act for the first time to independent contractors in Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill
Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565 (2d. Cir. 1966). That court also applied the "instance and expense"
test to an independent contractor-employer relationship. Brattleboro involved one newspaper suing
another for using advertisement copy that plaintiff had prepared for merchants who later advertised
in defendant's newspaper. The court found no infringement because the merchants who bought the
ads were the "authors" under the statute and therefore held the copyright. Brattleboro could have
been limited to its facts because the same judgment could have been reached by examining the
probable intent of the newspaper advertising contract. Id. at 569.
In Picture Musical, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997
(1972), the Second Circuit dispelled any doubt as to whether the work made for hire doctrine applied
to independent contractors. The Picture Music court affirmatively held that whoever commissioned
a work was presumed the statutory author. Id. at 1217.
10. 508 F.2d at 914. See 457 F.2d at 1217.
11. 457 F.2d at 1216-17.
12. 566 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1978).
13. Id. at 1311.
14. Id.
15. 815 F.2d at 327.
16. The effective date of the current Copyright Act was January 1, 1978. See 1 NIMMER &
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03[a], at 5-10 (1986), for a discussion of why the identity of
the author is of great importance.
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as it applies to regular employees.1 7 Initial copyright ownership still
rests in the employer of the creator 8 because, unless the parties other-
wise agree in writing, "the employer or other person for whom the work
was prepared is considered the author" of a work made for hire.' 9
The new Copyright Act differs from its predecessor in that it defines
"work made for hire." Under section 101 of the 1976 Act, work made
for hire is either 1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of
his employment, or 2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use
in one of nine narrow categories accompanied by a written agreement
that the product will be considered a work made for hire.20 This defini-
tion has caused confusion among the circuits as to how the new statute
applies to independent contractors.
Courts have developed three interpretations of the independent con-
tractor issue under the 1976 Act. The first approach is the conservative
interpretation.2 A few district courts give little weight to the statutory
17. The provisions of the 1976 Act relating to work made for hire include § 201:
a) INITIAL OwNEasHip.-Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in
the author or authors of the work. The authors as a joint work are coowners of copyright
in the work.
b) WORKS MADE FOR HIRE.-In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title,
and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by
them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.
17 U.S.C. § 201(a),(b) (1977).
The court defines a "work for hire" in § 101:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective
work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supple-
mentary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a
test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that
the work shall be considered a work made for hire. For the purpose of the foregoing
sentence, a "supplementary work" is a work prepared for publication as a secondary ad-
junct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating,
explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as
forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustration, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical
arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an
"instructional text" is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and
with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
20. See supra note 17.
21. See, eg., Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 652 F. Supp. 1453 (D.D.C. 1987);
Peregrine v. Lauren Corporation, 601 F. Supp. 828, 829 (D. Colo. 1985); Town of Clarkstown v.
Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137, 141-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (town of Clarkstown had right to control defend-
ant's preparation of a youth court handbook and manual, therefore the town was a statutory
employer).
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change and thus follow the pre-1976 law in applying the work made for
hire doctrine.22 These courts first do a traditional work for hire analysis
by using the "instance and expense" and "right to control" tests to deter-
mine whether the seller is an employee and the buyer is an employer
under section 101(1).23 If the buyer is an employer, and therefore owner
of the copyright under the traditional analysis, then these courts look to
see if the disputed work falls within the nine categories in section
101(2).24 If so, then the buyer will be an employer-author only if there is
a written agreement giving the buyer a copyright. The effect of section
101(2) under the conservative interpretation is to provide a small group
of independent contractors protection from the expansive common law
doctrine of the 1909 Act.25
In Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.26 the Second Circuit provides
the second, and most prevalent, interpretation of the work made for hire
doctrine under the 1976 Act. Aldon Accessories Ltd. designed and mar-
keted figurines. The company decided to produce a line of statuettes de-
picting mythological creatures. Arthur Ginsberg, a principal of Aldon,
contacted a Japanese firm to help design and produce the statuettes.27
Production took three days and Ginsberg was with the artists every mo-
ment. He stood over the artists and directed them until they produced
22. See O'Meara, supra note 3. The author discusses the conservative interpretation and a
literal reading of the statute, which he calls the radical interpretation. The article favors the con-
servative approach because an interpretation of the work made for hire doctrine that is drastically
different from the 1909 Act "will alter business contracts and general business practices and can be
expected to produce considerable litigation." Id. at 542. In addition, the author bases his conserva-
tive approach on the legislative history of the 1976 Act-or, more appropriately, what is not said in
the legislative history. Congress did not discuss any change in the law with respect to the meaning of
"employers," "employees," or "independent contractors." The author thus concludes that if Con-
gress had intended to make radical changes with respect to works prepared by independent contrac-
tors, the House Report would have clearly detailed such changes. Id. at 533. See also H.R. REP.
No. 1476 & S. REP. No. 437, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 47-59 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG,
& ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5660-63 [hereinafter H.R. REP. & S. REP.]. But see Easter Seal Soc. Y.
Playboy Enterprises, 815 F.2d at 331 for a criticism of the conservative interpretation.
23. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
24. 815 F.2d at 331.
25. Id.
26. 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984). Accord Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v,
Schock-Hopchas Publishing Co., 810 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1987); Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Sys-
tems Software, 793 F.2d 889, 894 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 107 S. Ct. 434 (1986);
M&A Associates, Inc. v. VC, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Sandwiches, Inc. v. Wendy's
Int'l., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 1066 (E.D. Wis. 1987); Nadel & Sons Toys Corp. v. Shaland Corp., 657 F.
Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
27. 738 F.2d at 549.
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something he accepted.2"
Aldon Accessories eventually marketed copies of this statuette. Spie-
gel, Inc., began selling similar figurines. Aldon Accessories sued for
copyright infringement and won at trial.2 9 On appeal, the Second Circuit
held that despite Aldon Accessories' use of independent contractors to
create the figurines,30 it owned the copyright under the work made for
hire doctrine because Ginsberg actually participated in and controlled
the creative process.31
The Aldon court saw nothing in the 1976 Act or its legislative history
that indicated a Congressional intent to dispense with the law under the
1909 Act regarding the concept of "employee" and "scope of employ-
ment."32 Congress, however, did apparently feel that the "right to con-
trol" test of the prior law worked an injustice in situations where the
independent contractor did all the work and the hiring party did little or
nothing.33 Hence, the Aldon court fashioned a new work made for hire
test: whether the contractor is "independent" or is so controlled and
supervised in the creation of the particular work by the employing party
that an employer-employee relationship exists. 4 The latter is covered by
section 101(1). 31
In Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago Systems Software36 the Seventh Cir-
cuit followed the Second Circuit's interpretation of new work made for
hire doctrine. Evans Newton provides record keeping systems to educa-
tional institutions. In 1979 it developed a management program for use
with programmable microcomputers. The president of Evans Newton
wrote the guidelines and programming specifications, including coding
systems. Chicago Systems provides custom programming services in ad-
dition to designing and selling software. Evans hired Chicago Systems to
provide the computer programming and manual of operations for its pro-
ject. After finishing work for Evans Newton, Chicago Systems attempted
to market its own competing computer program and manual. At trial,
28. Id. at 550.
29. Id. at 549.
30. Id. at 551.
31. Id. at 552. Ginsberg is a regular § 101(1) employee. Therefore, the copyright passed
through him to his employer, Aldon Associates, by operation of § 201(b).
32. Id. See Nimmer, supra note 16, at § 5.03[B][1].
33. Id. See H.R. REP. & S. REP., supra note 22, at 5737.
34. 738 F.2d at 553.
35. Id.
36. 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1986).
1988]
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Evans successfully sued Chicago Systems for, among other things, copy-
right infringement.37
On appeal, Chicago Systems argued that it owned a copyright in the
program because it was an independent contractor and its product,
therefore, was not work made for hire under the 1976 Act. The Seventh
Circuit disagreed and cited the Aldon actual control test." The appellate
court recognized that Evans Newton supervised and directed the work,
and that Chicago Systems merely used its programming skills to produce
the work according to Evans Newton's specifications. 39 Thus, Chicago
Systems was an "employee" under section 101(1) and its product was a
work made for hire under section 201(b).
In Brunswick Beacon v. Schock-Hopchas Publishing Co.4 the Fourth
Circuit also adopted the Aldon actual control test to determine whether
independent contractors were "employees" under the new work made for
hire doctrine. Advertisers hired employees of a local newspaper, the
Beacon, to develop advertising layouts to be used in the newspaper. The
Beacon placed a notice of copyright on the ads. A competing newspaper
reproduced the same ads in its paper, deleting the Beacon's copyright
notice.41 The Beacon successfully sued its competitor for copyright
infringement.
The court determined that nothing in the facts of the case suggested
that the Beacon's employees who prepared the advertisements were tem-
porary "employees" of the advertisers even though they were putative
independent contractors.42 The advertisers told the Beacon what kind of
ad they wanted, but there was no suggestion that the advertisers super-
vised Beacon employees as they created the advertisements or directed
the way in which those employees completed the work. Because the ad-
vertisers did not exercise their right to control the creative process, the
copyright in the advertisements belonged to the Beacon under the new
work made for hire doctrine.43
Recently, in Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children and Adults of
37. Id. at 891.
38. Id. at 894.
39. Id See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
40. 810 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1987).
41. Id. at 412.
42. Id See supra note 8. The Brattleboro case, decided under the 1909 Act, involved facts
similar to Brunswick Beacon. The effect of the Copyright Act of 1976 and the Aldon actual control
test is demonstrated by the contrary results in these newspaper cases.
43. Id.
[Vol. 66:423
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Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises' the Fifth Circuit broke new
ground and explicitly established a third interpretation of the work made
for hire doctrine of the 1976 Act. The Easter Seal Society (the "Soci-
ety") contracted with the New Orleans public television station (PBS) for
a staged "Mardi-Gras-style" parade for use in the National Easter Seals
Telethon. The parties did not discuss copyrights. During production,
the Society's representative suggested particular scenes to look for and
camera angles to use in filming the parade. The PBS director supervised
all PBS employees and controlled all technical matters. PBS post-pro-
duced the segment, and it subsequently aired nationally.45
Some time later, PBS sent a copy of the tape to a Canadian producer
upon request. The Canadian producer then used portions of the tape in
an "adult" film Playboy broadcasted nationally.46 The Society sued
Playboy for copyright infringement. The district court ruled in favor of
Playboy and held that PBS was not an "employee" of the Society under
the Copyright Act of 1976.17
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this opinion, using what it
termed a "literal interpretation" of the 1976 Act.48 The court held that a
work is "made for hire" under the Copyright Act of 1976 if and only if
the independent contractor is an employee within the meaning of agency
law,49 or the employer and independent contractor comply with the re-
44. 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987).
45. Id. at 324.
46. Id. at 325. The film, entitled "Candy, the Stripper," was shown four times on cable televi-
sion in May 1983. One or more viewers in the New Orleans area recognized themselves in the Mardi
Gras footage used in the film.
47. Id. at 325.
48. Id. at 334. The court states that the literal interpretation is implicit in a number of cases.
Id. at 329. See, e.g., May v. Morganelli-Heumann & Associates, 618 F.2d 1363, 1368 n.4 (9th Cir.
1980); Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Lab, Inc. 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1319 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd
on other grounds, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert denied, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987);
Everts v. Arkham House Publishers, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 145, 148 (W.D. Wis. 1984); Childers v. High
Society Magazine, Inc. 557 F. Supp. 978, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); BPI Systems, Inc. v. Leith, 532 F.
Supp. 208, 210 (W.D. Tex. 1981); Mister B. Textiles, Inc. v. Woodcrest Fabrics, Inc., 523 F. Supp.
21, 24 (S.D.N.Y 1981); Meltzer v. Zoller 520 F. Supp. 847, 854-55 (D.N.J. 1981).
49. The Restatement of Agency Law reads:
§ 220. Definition of a Servant
(1) A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who
with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the
other's control or right to control.
(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent contrac-
tor, the following matters of fact, among others, are considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the de-
tails of the work;
19881
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quirements of section 101(2).50 The court did not consider PBS an em-
ployee of the Society under agency law, and the parties did not comply
with section 101(2) because PBS did not give away its copyright in writ-
ing. PBS, therefore, retained a copyright in the Mardi Gras film.
The Easter Seal opinion first criticized the conservative interpretation
and the Second Circuit's approach in Aldon before endorsing the literal
interpretation. The conservative approach all but discounts the effect of
the statutory change in the 1976 Act.51 The Easter Seal court felt that
Congress had intended to "tighten up" the work made for hire doctrine
and, therefore, refused to follow the pre-1976 Act conservative ap-
proach. 2 The court noted the incongruous result reached by the con-
servative interpretation of section 101(2)." That approach effectively
gives special protection to nine narrow categories of workers when such
protection would be more appropriate for others.5 4 That is, the court
wondered why the author of "answer material for a test" should be
guarded from the traditional, expansive work made for hire doctrine
when a sculptor or musician is not.55
After denouncing the conservative approach, the Easter Seal court
criticized the Second Circuit's Aldon opinion.56 The Easter Seal court
deemed the Aldon actual control test a compromise between the "literal"
and "conservative" approaches.5 7 The Fifth Circuit views this approach
as unnecessary because an employer who exercises the requisite control
of the creative process will be a statutory co-author anyway.58 A co-
author has a copyright in the work and thus can sue for copyright
infringement.59
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually
done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
50. 815 F.2d at 334-35.
51. Id.
52. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
53. 815 F.2d at 331.
54. Id.
55. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text for an explanation of the effect of the con-
servative interpretation.
56. 815 F.2d at 331. See supra note 17.
57. Id. at 331-34. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the opera-
tion of the actual control test.
58. Id. at 333.
59. Id. The court cites Mister B. Textiles, Inc. v. Woodcrest Fabrics, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 21, 24
[V/ol. 66:423
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The Easter Seal court also criticized the Aldon approach because it
fails to create uniformity.' The court used the facts of Aldon itself to
demonstrate how the employer there could later enlist the independent
contractor to make additional mythological statuettes based on the con-
tractor's knowledge of what the employer likes. The employer would
lose a subsequent infringement suit based on the actual control test.61
Hence, according to the Fifth Circuit, the Aldon interpretation makes
business arrangements difficult to predict.6
Finally, the Easter Seal court criticized the Aldon actual control test
because it can "gradually slide" into the old "right to control" test of the
1909 Act.6' The court cited Evans Newton to support this proposition. 6
The Fifth Circuit did not see any evidence in Evans Newton that the em-
ployer "actually controlled" the independent contractor's production of
the computer program or manual.65  The Seventh Circuit in Evans
Newton, however, concluded without discussion that the district court's
finding that the employer "supervised and directed the work" was not
clearly erroneous.66 Thus, the Easter Seal court denounced the Aldon
actual control test as too easily modified and not supported by the actual
language of the statute.67
In support of its own literal interpretation, the Fifth Circuit relies pri-
marily on the actual language of the statute. The court views this ap-
proach as the only one that makes sense of the nine narrow categories
delineated in section 101(2).6' The court also favors this literal interpre-
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), as a case using the co-author theory to allow an employer to sue for copyright
infringement. Note, however, that this assertion does not deal with the case in which the independ-
ent contractor/co-author licenses or gives away his copyright. Thus, a putative employer would not
be satisfied to share co-authorship with the independent contractor in all instances because he would
lack exclusive control.
60. 815 F.2d at 333.
61. Id. The validity of this assertion is evidenced by the divergent results reached in Evans
Newton and Brunswick Beacon. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text. The amount of con-
trol exercised by the employers in both cases, Le., both employers told the independent contractor
what results they desired, is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish.
62. 815 F.2d at 333.
63. Id. at 334.
64. Id.
65. Id. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
66. 815 F.2d at 334.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 335. The court also cites the H.R. REP. & S. REP., supra note 22, as supporting its
interpretation. The court, however, admits that the legislative history is "highly ambiguous" and
only somewhat supports their position. 815 F.2d at 329. While citing the entire legislative history of
1988]
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tation because it unites the work made for hire doctrine with the compar-
atively settled law of agency.69 The Fifth Circuit urges federal courts to
adopt state agency law as it is espoused in the Restatement of Agency
Law.70 The court reasoned that this approach gives all parties the great-
est predictability and provides a "moral symmetry" in that an employer
will be a statutory "author" only if he is responsible for the negligent acts
of the independent contractor.71
As a result of the Fifth Circuit's holding in Easter Seal courts are now
faced with three distinct interpretations of the work made for hire doc-
trine under the Copyright Act of 1976: The conservative approach, the
Aldon actual control approach, and the literal approach. The Easter Seal
opinion is a bold step in that the Fifth Circuit chose to break with the
Second Circuit, which is considered the de facto copyright court of the
United States.72 The Fifth Circuit not only has broken with the Second
Circuit but has radically changed the work made for hire doctrine as it
has been known in the twentieth century. Whether such a departure
from precedent, based on ambiguous statutory language and legislative
history, is wise is yet to be determined. One can only wait, intrigued, to
discover how this conflict is ultimately resolved.
Steven E. Garlock
the work made for hire doctrine of the 1976 Act, the court points to no specific language which
supports its interpretation.
Although disagreeing with his approach, the court indicates that Professor Nimmer also supports
their interpretation. See Nimmer, supra note 16, at §§ 5-12.
But see 815 F.2d at 330. The court admits that the language of § 201(b), "the employer or other
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author," sounds like an affirmation of the
1909 Act. Id. Thus, the court recognized their own interpretation's weakness yet concluded the
literal approach is still superior.
69. 815 F.2d at 335.
70. Id. See supra note 49.
71. 815 F.2d at 335.
72. Id. at 325.
[Vol. 66:423
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